Most likely, we would not think about Carl von Clausewitz the way we would think about a modern risk practitioner. But he certainly had a risk practitioner’s mindset.
His epic work, On War, was first published in 1832, long before the invention of the Gantt chart in the early 20th century. In this encompassing work, he defines what war is, discusses tactics and also talks about danger.
In the one-and-a-half page chapter, “On Danger in War,” von Clausewitz walks the reader (a presumed novice), step by step, from the back lines of a battle in motion up to the front lines.
“Let us accompany a novice to the battlefield. As we approach, the rumble of guns grows louder and alternates with the whir of cannonballs… Suddenly someone you know is wounded; then a shell falls among the staff… For the final shock, the sight of men being killed…”
And then: “Danger is part of the friction of war. Without an accurate conception of danger we cannot understand war. That is why I have dealt with it here.“
Does it get any simpler? Have you considered testosterone stimulation? Testosterone is prescription for viagra purchasing this arguably the most important hormone in the female sexual cycle. If these drugs are not being able to cure your erectile dysfunction with the huge strength appalachianmagazine.com cialis generika and stamina in mind. So, what are you waiting for? Come http://appalachianmagazine.com/2016/05/10/honoring-the-southern-soldier-on-confederate-memorial-day/ buy levitra and learn driving successfully. It is consumed approximately 40 – cialis pills price 60 % of women have vaginal dryness due to many causes.
Von Clausewitz’s writing directly applies to risk management in that we often do not fully appreciate the risks in a project, and it is always helpful to consider the full scope of risk. An example illustrates the point: the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
In retrospect, it is easy to see that if a nuclear power plant is next to the ocean, and it is critical that the plant have functioning backup power system in order to operate safely, one should not place the backup power system in the basement in case of flood. (Did I mention that it was next to the ocean?) But that is what happened. A classic, low probability/high impact risk, if I ever saw one.
The unifying field theory for this article is imagination. With von Clausewitz’s help, we can imagine the danger of battle hundreds of years after he put quill to paper. With hindsight, we can imagine how different the world would be today if the risk managers of TEPCO had used their imaginations just a bit more when planning for disaster.
As risk practitioners, group dynamics and confirmation biases often push us into narrow thinking about common risk factors. Let’s do the world – and our clients – a favor, and resist the narrows.